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DETERMINATE SENTENCING IN CALIFORNIA AND
ILLINOIS: ITS EFFECT ON SENTENCE
DISPARITY AND PRISONER
REHABILITATION
The movement away from "indeterminate"' toward "definite"2
sentences for persons convicted of crime marks a major development in
the administration of criminal justice in the United States.3 The trend
emanates primarily from a growing dissatisfaction over indeterminate
sentencing systems that have failed to rehabilitate criminal offenders4
and have created vast disparities in sentences imposed on like defend-
ants for like crimes. California and Illinois have been in the vanguard
of states that have turned to definite sentencing systems in response to
1. Under an indeterminate sentencing system, the judge ordinarily sets a minimum but not
a maximum term for confinement; a parole authority decides the ultimate release date. See Pret-
tyman, The Indeterminate Sentence and the Right to Treatment, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 7, 13 n.27
(1972). See genera4y D'Esposito, Sentence Disparity: Causes and Cures, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
182, 185-86 (1969); Note, "Defective Delinquent" and Habitual Criminal Offender Statutes-Re-
quired Constitutional Safeguards, 20 RUT. L. REV. 756, 756 n.3 (1966).
An indefinite sentence, in contrast, consists of a legislatively established minimum and maxi-
mum term of detention during which the prisoner may be released. See P. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUS-
TICE, AND CORRECTION 432-33 (1960); Prettyman, supra, at 13 n.27. See also Dershowitz,
Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 305 (1974).
2. "A definite commitment is said to be one fixed by the judge ... at a term of years which
may be less than (but not more than) the maximum provided by statute for the particular crime."
S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 157-58 (2d ed. 1973). See also ABA PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTER-
NATIVES AND PROCEDURES 131 (Approved Draft 1968).
3. D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS 238-49
(1975); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971); Bayley, Good Intentions Gone Awry-A Proposalfor Funda-
mental Change in Criminal Sentencing, 51 WASH. L. REV. 529, 551-63 (1976); O'Leary, Gottfred-
son & Gelman, Contemporary Sentencing Proposals, 11 CRiM. L. BULL. 555, 563-70 (1975);
McGee, 4 New Look at Sentencing Part 1, 38 FED. PROB. 3 (1974).
4. Bayley, supra note 3, at 562; Morris, The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Puntive Phi-
losoph:j; 72 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1974); O'Leary, Gottfredson & Gelman, supra note 3, at
562. Contra, Hodges, Crime Prevention by' the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 1971 AM. J. OF PSYCH.
128, 291-95 (indeterminate sentence has met dual purpose of protecting society and treating pris-
oners more humanely).
5. R. HOOD & R. SPARKS, KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 141-54 (1970); Cobum, Disparity in
Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 RUr. L. REV. 207 (1971); Diamond & Zeisel,
Sentencing Councils: A Stud, of Sentence Disparity and its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109
(1975); Rubin, Disparity and Equaliy of Sentences-4 Constitutional Challenge, 40 F.R.D. 55, 56
(1965).
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these concerns over rehabilitation and sentence disparities. This Note
analyzes and compares those provisions of the California and Illinois
statutes most relevant to these concerns.
I. THE DEFINITE SENTENCE: ITS DEVELOPMENT
The origins of the definite sentence can be traced to the late 1700's.
The "classical" school of English penology objected to the harsh and
arbitrary sentences imposed by judges who held unlimited sentencing
powers.6 The classical school proposed that the legislature determine
sentences for all types of offenses to make the "punishment fit the
crime." 7
In the 1880's, however, the neoclassicists argued that sentences
should be less definite in their specificity and consistency of applica-
tion, and urged consideration of extenuating circumstances such as the
age and mental condition of the defendant. The positivist school,
which originated in Italy in the nineteenth century, turned further to-
ward individualized sentencing, proposing that judges should be edu-
cated in the psychological sciences and should fashion sentences
according to the needs of each defendant.9 This proposal also con-
tained elements of the indeterminate sentence because it removed the
power of sentencing from the legislature and returned sentencing dis-
cretion to the judge. 10
Ultimate credit for the development of the indeterminate sentence,
however, is given to Alexander Maconochie, an Australian who insti-
tuted a system in which prisoners reduced their sentences through scho-
lastic and work achievement." Maconochie based his system on the
theory that imprisonment should reform prisoners for their return to
6. Reid, A Rebuttal to the Attack on the Indeterminate Sentence, 51 WASH. L. REv. 565, 567
n.13 (1976); Weinstein, The Sentence Without a Period... The Paradox of Criminal Sentences, 32
Mo. B.J. 490, 491 (1976). See also Coburn, supra note 5.
7. Bruce, Burgess & Harno, A Study of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole in the Slate of
Illinois, 19 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 10, 26 (Part II, 1928); Reid, supra note 6, at 567 n.13.
8. Bruce, Burgess & Harno, supra note 7, at 27. The term "neoclassical" arose from the
school's advocacy of a sentence whose length was specified at the outset.
9. S. REID, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY 114 (1976); Bruce, Burgess & Harno, supra note 7, at
28; Weinstein, supra note 6, at 493-94. The term "positivist" was applied to this school of thought
because of its optimistic belief that the criminal could benefit from his sentence.
10. Reid, supra note 6, at 567 n.13.
11. Id See generally White, Alexander Maconochie and the Development of Parole, 67 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 72 (1976); see also Bruce, Burgess & Harno, supra note 7, at 64-65 n.3.
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society. The system thus combined the indeterminate sentence, in
which a prisoner's personal progress determined his time of release,
with rehabilitation.' 2
In the United States the definite sentence prevailed until New York
established an "indefinite" system in 1876.13 By 1910 twenty-one states
had adopted the New York model, 4 and today thirty-five jurisdictions
use some form of indeterminate sentencing.' 5 Until recently, Califor-
nia and Illinois also maintained indeterminate sentencing systems. 6 A
California defendant received a statutorily determined maximum term
during which he could be released at any time.'17 In Illinois the judge
set the minimum and maximum periods for detention, and the parole
board could release the prisoner at any point within that range.'8
California and Illinois, however, now lead the movement toward the
definite sentence. One reason for this predilection is the failure of the
indeterminate sentence to achieve its touted objective-the rehabilia-
tion of prisoners.' 9 The sole justification for the flexible indeterminate
sentence is the belief that the prisoner can reform himself, however
long a time that may take.2" The definite sentence, on the other hand,
12. Prettyman, supra note 1, at 13-14.
13. Id. at 14; see note 1 supra.
14. S. RUBIN, supra note 2, at 157.
15. Id. at 158. The federal courts may choose from a number of sentencing alternatives: (1)
a definite term, after one-third of which parole eligibility begins; (2) an indeterminate sentence,
consisting of a minimum and maximum term set by the judge, the minimum being no more than
one-third of the maximum; (3) an indeterminate sentence in which a maximum term is fixed by
the court, and release is at the discretion of the Parole Commission; (4) a term of six months set by
the judge, the remainder of a definite sentence spent on probation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651, 4205
(1976).
16. 1917 Cal. Stats., ch. 527 § 1168. Indeterminate Sentence Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 142.
17. "[The court in imposing the sentence shall not fix the term or duration of the period of
imprisonment." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (Deering 1971) (repealed 1977). "[T]he Adult Author-
ity may determine. . . after the actual commencement of imprisonment, what length of time, if
any, such person shall be imprisoned .. " CAL. PENAL CODE § 3020 (Deering 1971) (repealed
1977). See Coonrad, Parole Revocation and Indeterminate Sentencing The Cai~fornia Experience,
2 NEW ENG. J. PRISON L. 15, 15 (1975).
18. "A sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be an indeterminate sentence. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (a) (1973) (sections (b) and (c) describe the maximum and minimum
sentences for each class of felony). "Every person serving a term of imprisonment for a felony
I , . shall be eligible for parole when he has served: (1) the minimum term of an indeterminate
sentence . . . ." Id. § 1003-3-3(a).
19. Morris, supra note 4, at 1161; Reid, supra note 6, at 565.
20. In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972) (purpose of indeter-
minate sentence is rehabilitation). See generally Bruce, Burgess & Haro, supra note 7, at chs. 10-
15; Reid, supra note 6, at 565-68.
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generally has been justified as a means to achieve the goals of deter-
rence and retribution.2" The historical vacillation between sentencing
postures directly relates to trends of thought in the psychological, be-
havioral, and criminal-penal fields; at times the societal interest in de-
terrence and retribution outweighs the rehabilitative ideal.22 The goals
of deterrence or retribution and rehabilitation are not incompatible
when combined cohesively, and modem sentencing approaches at-
tempt to reflect all three.2 3 Rehabilitation, however, seldom is prac-
ticed effectively,24 and the rehabiliation theory has not been tested
adequately for lack of satisfactory prison treatment facilities and medi-
cally knowledgeable judges and parole boards.2 These failures under-
lie the shift to determinate sentencing.
A second cause of the definite sentence movement is the disparity
among sentences imposed on like defendants who have committed the
26same crime.z6 Sentence disparity exists within a single jurisdiction,
among neighboring jurisdictions, and on a national level.2 7 Disparities
21. Reid, supra note 6, at 566.
22. See generally Bruce, Burgess & Harno, supra note 7, at chs. 5-15.
23. Id. at 71. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), the Supreme Court approved of
the trend to combine rehabilitiation and retribution in a single sentencing scheme. "Retribution is
no longer the dominant objectivb of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders
have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence." Id. at 248. "[A] judge should consider
in imposing sentence: '1st. The protection of society against wrong-doers. 2nd. The punish-
ment-or much better-the discipline of the wrong-doer. 3rd. The reformation and rehabilitation
of the wrong-doer. 4th. The deterrence of others from the commission of like offenses.'" Id. at
248-49 n.13 (quoting S. GLUECK, PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 113 (1933)). See also
United States v. Baker, 487 F.2d 360, 362-64 (2d Cir. 1973) (Lumbard, J., dissenting in part).
24. D. FOrEL, supra note 3, at 114-26; Morris, supra note 4, at 116 1; Prettyman, supra note 1,
at 19-21; Weinstein, supra note 6, at 497-98.
25. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW vITHOUT ORDER 88-100 (1973); Bayley,
supra note 3, at 551-63; Morris, supra note 4, at 1179; Reid, supra note 6, at 572-79, 593-601;
Weinstein, supra note 6, at 497. See generally In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 749 (1972); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 439
(1974) (dangerousness, a crucial criterion of parole boards' decisions, cannot be accurately pre-
dicted or evaluated); Prettyman, suora note 1, at 25-37 (failure of Maryland's Patuxent Institution,
the foremost attempt at "curing" criminals through medical and psychological treatment on an
indefinite basis). Comment, Senate Bill 42 and the Myth of Shortened Sentencesfor Calfornia
Offenders.- The Effects ofthe Unform Determinate Sentencing Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1176,
1182 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Bill 42. (tendency of psychiatrists to "overpredict" dan-
gerousness of prisoners often results in unnecessarily long prison terms).
26. See Berger, Equal Protection and Criminal Sentencing: Legal and Policy Considerations,
71 Nw. U.L. REV. 29, 32 (1976) ("At one level, disparity means no more than the imposition of
different sentences upon different defendants and as such is an inherent part of any sytem of
individualized sentencing."); Rubin, supra note 5, at 56.
27. See Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 5, at 110; Rubin, supra note 5, at 55. For a criticism of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/10
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in the indeterminate sentencing systems result primarily from the per-
sonal reactions of judges to particular cases and the inconsistent actions
of parole boards.2 8
Judicial individualism may be controlled, in part, by a minimally
discretionary sentence structure, 29 but this solution deals inadequately
with the distinct differences among defendants and fact situations. A
more just method to reduce sentence disparity is to restrict the discre-
tion of the parole board, because the board's function is secondary to
that of the judiciary. The parole board operates with few, if any, guide-
lines on when a prisoner is "cured" and ready for release,30 and reaches
its decisions after only a short review of each case." For prisoners with
identical sentences, this system of parole results in vast differences in
release dates that are unrelated to the prisoner's progress toward reha-
bilitation. 2 Because the parole authority need exist only under an in-
determinate sentencing system, 33 a definite sentence structure
eliminates this cause of sentence disparity.
disparate sentences given to codefendents, see United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453, 455-56 (7th
Cir. 1959).
28. See D'Esposito, supra note 1, at 185; McAnany, Merritt & Tromanhauser, Illinois Recon-
siders "Flat Time'- An Analysis ofthe Impact ofthe Justice Model, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 621, 640
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time'1; Rubin, supra note 5, at 58-60. Other
reasons for sentence disparities include: excessive judicial discretion with few guidelines; differing
social attitudes; varying personal backgrounds of judges; different geographic locations; race and
ethnicity of the defendant; and the availability of presentence reports. Coburn, supra note 5, at
210-11. For a discussion on race and socioeconomic background of the defendant as major
sources of disparity, see H. HAGAN, EXTRA-LEGAL ATTRIBUTES AND CRIMINAL SENTENCING:
AN ASSESSMENT OF A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT 357, 362-74 (1974).
29. The ideal definite sentence structure, under which the sentence is imposed entirely with-
out regard to the defendant's personal history and attributes, eliminates judges' individual reac-
tions. California and Illinois attempt to reduce this cause of sentence disparity by severely
narrowing the range of years from which a judge can choose to impose the defendant's sentence.
See note 47 infra and accompanying text. This range, however, still allows the judge to consider
the individual circumstances of the defendant's case. See notes 98-100, 102-106 infra and accom-
panying text.
30. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
31. See In re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974) (parole hearings
short and very perfunctory); In re Tucker, 5 Cal. 3d 171, 486 P.2d 657, 95 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1971)
(same). See also Meyerson, The Board of Prison Terms and Paroles and Indeterminate Sentencing:
.4 Critique, 51 WASH. L. REv. 617, 625-28 (1976); Murray, Ringer & Alarcon, Prison Reform:
Backward or Forward?, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 356, 358 (1975). See generally Note, The CaliforniaAdult
.4uthorit --Administrative Sentencing and the Parole Decision as a Problem in Administrative Dis-
cretion, 5 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 360 (1972).
32. Senate Bill 42, supra note 25 at 1185, 1203.
33. In a definite-sentence scheme, the judge sets the prison release date, and it may be altered
only by that judge.
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Dissatisfaction with indeterminate sentencing systems also arises
from their susceptibility to constitutional infirmities.34 In Specht v.
Patterson35 the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional
under the due process clause a Colorado sex-offender statutb that pro-
vided a special indeterminate sentence (one day to life) for defendants
who present a particular danger to society, without opportunity for a
presentence hearing. Although the Court based its decision on the de-
fendant's inability to challenge the factual basis for his placement into
the "danger" category, the Court may have been particularly protective
of the defendant's rights because of the extraordinary potential for
abuse inherent in open-ended sentences.
Several jurisdictions have found equal protection violations in sen-
tencing schemes that permit longer indeterminate sentences for females
than males on the assumption that women are more likely to reform.36
34. See generally Berger, supra note 26, at 35-51; D'Esposito, supra note 1, at 191-94; Rubin,
supra note 5, at 62-69. For an expansive view of the constitutional implications of indeterminate
sentences, see In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (indeterminate
sentence of up to life imprisonment for second conviction of indecent exposure held unconstitu-
tional as disproportionate to the crime). See generally 10 SAN DIECO L. REv. 793 (1973).
On balance, however, the courts have rejected constitutional objections to the indeterminate
sentence on either equal protection or "cruel and unusual punishment" grounds. Equal protection
is too strict a standard to impose on the individualized indeterminate sentencing process. Berger,
supra note 26, at 38-40. See People v. Kostal, 159 Cal. App. 2d 444, 323 P.2d 1020 (1958); Note,
EqualProtection Appliedto Sentencing, 58 IowA L. REv. 596, 612-15 (1973); 81 HARV. L. REv. 890
(1968). The "cruel and unusual" clause has been applied to excessive sentences, see, e.g., Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), but not, in general, to the indeterminate sentence. See
Hendrick v. United States, 357 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1966); Rogers v. United States, 304 F.2d 520
(5th Cir. 1962); People v. Dyer, 269 Cal. App. 2d 209, 74 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1969); People v. Polk, 10
IlL. App. 3d 408, 294 N.E.2d 113 (1973) (four-to-twenty years for indecent liberties with child
represents moral beliefs of People, and thus is not cruel or disproportionate); State ex rel. Nelson
v. Tahash, 265 Minn. 330, 121 N.W.2d 584 (1963) (indeterminate sentence not cruel and unusual
because maximum penalty is subject to discretionary reduction and is not frail for lack of cer-
tainty). But see People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975) (cruel or
unusual punishment is that which is so disproportionate to the crime as to shock the conscience);
In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) (same); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d
410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (same); People v. Kane, 31 Il App. 3d 500, 333
N.E.2d 247 (1975) (seven-to-fifteen years for possession of heroin held disproportionate and re-
duced to minimum of four years because defendant was first offender with good work history); 61
CALIF. L. REv. 418 (1973). See generally Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908) (indetermi-
nate sentence is constitutional); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902) (same), In re Lee, 177 Cal,
690, 171 P. 958 (1918).
35. 386 U.S. 605 (1967). See also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (procedures under
Wisconsin's Sex Crimes Act denied equal protection and due process).
36. United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Liberti v. York,
28 Conn. Super. 9, 246 A.2d 106 (1968); State v. Chambers, 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78 (1973);
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/10
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Other courts have sustained due process challenges to indeterminate
sentencing systems.37 Arguably, due process is denied when a person is
held indefinitely until "cured" but does not receive effective treat-
ment s3 particularly if the patient would be released at an earlier time
under a definite sentence.39
II. DETERMINATE SENTENCING IN CALIFORNIA AND ILLINOIS
Consternation over the indeterminate sentence led to the passage of
determinate sentencing legislation in California in 1976 and Illinois in
1977.40 These enactments seek to promote uniformity of sentencing
and to eliminate disparity in sentences.41 Each act also incorporates
deterrence and retribution principles into its sentence structures4 2 and
minimizes the importance of rehabilitation.43 This part of the Note
Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968). See also 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 830
(1974).
37. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); Rouse v. Cam-
eron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
38. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Katz, The Right to Treat-
ment-.An Enchanting Legal Fiction;, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 755 (1969). See Martinez v. Mancusi,
443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970) (denial of medical treatment cruel and unusual); Wyatt v. Stickney,
325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (denial of psychiatric treatment cruel and unusual); Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (lack of effective rehabilitation contributed to holding
that treatment was cruel and unusual), afd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
39. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
40. Uniform Determinate Sentence Act of 1976, ch. 1139 CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering) (effec-
tive July 1, 1977) (amended 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-1008 (effective Feb. 1, 1978);
see D. FOGEL, supra note 3. Maine was the first state to enact a fully determinate sentencing
structure. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1151, 1252 (1976).
41. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(f) (Deering 1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.2
(1978). See also ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 11. See generally Pusateri & Scott, Illinois'New Un~fed Code
of Corrections, 61 ILL. B.J. 62, 69 (1972).
42. "The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is pun-
ishment." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (a)(1) (Deering 1979). See note 43 infra
43. "[Punishment] is best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with
provision for uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same offense under similar
circumstances." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (Deering 1979). But see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1001-1-2 (1978), which provides for rehabilitation and penalties proportionate to the offense.
For criticism of the Illinois "punishment-equality approach," see Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time,"
supra note 28, at 660. The proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform Act of 1978, S. 1437, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), provides that one factor to be considered when sentencing is "the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities." Id. § 2003(a)(F). One purpose of the proposed code is
to "promote the correction and rehabilitation of persons who engage in such conduct, recognizing
that imprisonment is generally not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilita-
tion." Id. § 101(b)(4).
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compares major provisions of the California and Illinois statutes, fo-
cusing in particular on their effect on rehabilitation and sentence dis-
parity.44
The most significant revision enacted by each state's legislature is the
elimination of the minimum-maximum sentencing system under which
the judge (in Illinois)45 or the statute (in California)46 sets a sentence
range and the parole authority later decides the prison-release date. 7
Both states now require a determinate sentence-a specific term of im-
prisonment selected by the judge from a relatively narrow range set
forth in the statute.48 These states apply a determinate sentence to most
felonies and all misdemeanors, but reserve an indeterminate sentence
for certain aggravated felonies.49 California and Illinois also classify
felonies and misdemeanors into a number of smaller categories (with
corresponding ranges of sentences) to further restrict judicial discre-
tion.5 0 Although it is too early for clear patterns to emerge, curtailed
44. California and Illinois have been chosen for discussion because those states' codes most
clearly demonstrate the concern over inadequacy of rehabilitation and disparity among sentences.
See note 122 infra for a list of states that have revised or considered revision of their indetermi-
nate sentence laws. See generally Zarr, Commentaries on the Maine Criminal Code (Sentencing),
28 ME. L. REV. 117 (1976).
45. "A sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be an indeterminate sentence set by the
court .... " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (1973) (amended 1978).
46. "[Defendant shall] be sentenced to be imprisoned in a state prison, but the court in im-
posing the sentence shall not fix the term or duration of the period of imprisonment." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1168 (Deering 1976) (amended 1976).
47. "mhe Adult Authority may determine and redetermine, after the actual commencement
of imprisonment, what length of time, if any, such person shall be imprisoned .. " CAL. PENAL
CODE § 3020 (Deering 1976) (amended 1976). "The Parole and Pardon Board shall determine the
time of release on parole. . . ." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-2(a)(1) (1973) (amended 1978).
48. California provides for "determinate sentences ... to be imposed by the court with spec-
ified discretion." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (Deering 1979). "A sentence of imprisonment
for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court .... " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-8-1(a) (1979).
49. The indeterminate sentence is retained for aggravated felonies because the judge should
have unfettered discretion to deal with the unusual defendant in ways not contemplated by the
narrow range of sentencing alternatives properly applicable to the vast majority of similar defend-
ants and offenses. California regards murder as an aggravated crime, CAt. PENAL CODE § 190
(Deering 1979), and persons convicted of murder may receive a sentence of life imprisonment, life
imprisonment without parole, or death. Id. Illinois imposes life imprisonment on persons found
guilty of murder if the murder is "brutal" or if the person is adjudged a "habitual criminal." ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a) (1979).
50. California treats misdemeanors in a single group, punishable by a term not to exceed six
months, or a fine up to $500, or both. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (Deering 1979). Felonies comprise
10 classes. Id. § 1170(a)(2). Illinois classifies its offenses as Murder, Class X (aggravated felonies),
Class 1, 2, 3, or 4 felonies, and Class A, B, or C misdemeanors. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/10
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judicial discretion should produce greater uniformity in sentences im-
posed for identical crimes.5 At the same time, however, the elimina-
tion of minimum-maximum sentencing vests a new responsibility in
judges.52 Both the California and Illinois statutes now require that the
judge determine the prisoner's date of release.53 This emasculation of
the parole authority especially alters sentencing responsibility in Cali-
fornia. Prior to the new legislation, a California judge had only to de-
cide whether imprisonment was warranted and automatically assign
the appropriate statutory sentence range,54 allowing the parole author-
ity to determine the ultimate length of imprisonment."
Another significant revision in California and Illlinois law, which
complements the adoption of the definite sentence, is the abolition of
the parole authority. 6 The California Department of Corrections57
now governs "parole," but the process is wholly unlike the traditional
parole procedure in which the crucial element is the board's power to
release a prisoner at any time. The Department of Corrections now
adds "parole," a period of up to three years, to each term of imprison-
(1979). Illinois maintained a classification system as early as 1973, but the prior system did not
contain the "Class X" category. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-1 (1973) (amended 1978). Other
states also categorize criminal offenses. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-25 (six classes of felo-
nies), § 53a-26 (four classes of misdemeanors) (1979); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 4 (Supp.
1978) (five classes of crimes); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 55.05 (McKinney 1975) (five classes of felonies,
three of misdemeanors).
51. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text; Reid, supra note 6, at 569.
52. See Illinois Reconsiders "Hat Time, " supra note 28 at 660.
53. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (Deering 1966) (amended 1976).
55. Id. § 3020.
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000 (Deering 1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-1(a) (1979).
Maine abolished parole in 1975. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1254 (Supp. 1978). Another
section of the code, however, emasculates this innovation because it terms any sentence over one
year "tentative" and permits the Department of Corrections to petition the trial court to shorten
the sentence if "as a result of the Department's evaluation of such person's progress toward a
noncriminal way of life, the Department is satisfied that the sentence of the trial court may have
been based upon a misapprehension as to the history, character, or mental condition of the of-
fender." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1154(2) (Supp. 1978). The practical effect of this sec-
tion may be to release many prisoners on rehabilitative grounds, which is the traditional function
of parole. See Zarr, supra note 44, at 144-47.
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3831 (1978), provides for "early release," as distinct from parole.
The proposed code requires an automatic postimprisonment term to be served under supervision
in the community at the end of any prison term. Id. § 3841. For a thorough discussion of federal
parole, see Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810
(1975).
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5002 (Deering 1979).
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ment for a felony,5" which the Department may waive for "good
cause." 59 The statute, however, provides no guidelines to determine
"good cause"; thus the parole waiver may lead to disparity in the total
length of sentences.6" The Community Release Board of the Depart-
ment of Corrections sets guidelines for the conditions and length of
parole,6 ' but again, disparity could result because the law provides no
standard of "good cause." 62
An integral part of the new parole scheme in California is the exten-
sion to prisoners of credit for good behavior and for participation in
work, educational, and vocational prison programs.63 The Department
of Corrections has authority to reduce a prisoner's sentence by one-
third for accumulated "good-time" credits. 64  Conversely, a prisoner
loses credits when he violates prison rules or fails to participate in
prison programs. 5 This system accords with the determinate sentence
concept in that the prisoners themselves, rather than an outside author-
ity, account for any unequal periods of incarceration for like crimes.
Illinois retains even fewer remnants of the traditional parole system.
The Illinois statute establishes a Prisoner Review Board to supervise
after-prison service.66 Members of the Board must have five years of
actual experience in penology, corrections work, medicine, psychology,
58. Id. § 3000. The Uniform Determinate Sentence Act of 1976 permitted only a one-year
period of parole. Id. § 3000 (Deering 1977) (amended 1978). Under the present code no person
serving a life sentence may be paroled (if parole is allowed) before seven years' imprisonment. Id.
§ 3046 (Deering 1979). See also Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in Caifornia." The
New Numbers Game, 9 PAC. L.J. 5, 73-87 (1978).
59. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3000(a), 5003.5 (Deering 1979).
60. See Comment, Senate Bill 42-The End of the Indeterminate Sentence, 17 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 133, 157 (1977).
61. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000(f) (Deering 1979). The Community Release Board, for exam-
ple, must release a felon who completes one continuous year of his additional term even though
the originally imposed term may have been longer, unless the Board determines that "good cause"
exists to continue the parole. Id. § 3001(a). The statute, however, does not provide guidelines to
determine "good cause."
62. See note 60 supra and accompanying text. Disparity also can arise because the Commu-
nity Release Board may revoke parole for cause (again undefined) after a hearing. CAL, PENAL
CODE §§ 3056-3064 (Deering 1979). For a discussion of prior California parole-revocation law,
see Coonrad, supra note 17, at 15.
63. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2930(a), 2931(c) (Deering 1979). See also Cassou & Taugher,
supra note 58, at 25, 77-79.
64. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2931, 4019 (Deering 1979).
65. Id. § 2932. The Community Release Board may deduct no more than 90 days of good
behavior credit or 30 days of participation credit during any eight-month period. Id. § 2932(d).
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-1(a) (1978).
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or other behavioral sciences. 67 The Illinois act, contrary to California's,
lists the conditions that prisoners must follow on "mandatory super-
vised release,"' 68 and specifies the length of supervision periods for vari-
ous categories of crime.6 9 Because the Board may not waive the period
of supervision for the first two years,"0 the Illinois system of determi-
nate sentences diminishes Board-created sentence disparity.7"
Illinois' system of "good-conduct" credits permits a one-day reduc-
tion in sentence for each day of prison time.72 This system implies that
a prisoner need only refrain from rules-violations to accumulate credits
toward his release.73 An Illinois prisoner thus may reduce his sentence
by one-half, but his California counterpart may obtain only a one-
third reduction.74 Illinois, however, does not grant "good-conduct" in-
centives for participation in prison work programs. The difference be-
tween the two states in "good-conduct" or "good-time" provisions,
therefore, may only result in equalizing the actual length of time served
by California and Illinois prisoners for similar crimes. Nevertheless,
Illinois' new provisions concerning post-imprisonment service proba-
67. Id. § 1003-3-1(b).
68. A prisoner must not violate any criminal statutes or carry any dangerous weapon; at the
Board's discretion, a prisoner must attend work or school, undergo medical treatment, support his
dependents, and report to an official of the Department of Corrections. Id. §§ 1003-3-7(a) to
1003-3-7(b). Illinois also allows the Board to assign other conditions. This allowance avoids over-
restriction by the statute, but can lead to disparity.
69. Id. § 1005-8-1(d). The statute provides a three-year mandatory supervised release term
for murder or a Class X felony, a two-year term for a Class I or Class 2 felony, and a one-year
term for a Class 3 or Class 4 felony. Id.
70. Id. Under the former Illinois procedure, members of the parole board read the master
files, interviewed the prisoners, and discussed the cases at the day's end to determine the parolees.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-1 (1975) (amended 1978). The Illinois Board based its decisions
on the following criteria: seriousness of the offense, number of prior offenses, participation in
prison educational programs, history of prison rule-breaking, employment prospects, marital sta-
tus and number of dependents, and age. A. Heinz, J. Heinz, Senderowitz & Vance, Sentencing by
Parole Board- An Evaluation, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 17 (1976).
71. See Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time," supra note 27, at 640-46. See generally White, supra
note 11, at 72; Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 282 (1971).
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(a)(2) (1978).
73. The statute states that the Department of Corrections is to prescribe rules regarding early
release and forfeiture of good-conduct credits, but mentions no specifics. Id. § 1003-6-3 (1978).
Maine allows a reduction of 10 days a month from a prisoner's sentence when the "record of
conduct shows that [the prisoner] has observed all the rules and requirements." ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tIt. 17-A, § 1253 (Supp. 1978). The Maine system thus resembles the Illinois approach in
that the prisoner need not participate in prison work programs to qualify for the reduction.
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3 (1978). See note 64 supra and accompanying text. See
also Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time," supra note 28, at 652-57.
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bly will promote sentence uniformity better than California's, because
California retains more echoes of the disparity-prone parole system."
The California and Illinois statutes also differ with respect to the
length of sentences. In all classifications except certain cases of murder,
Illinois allows the imposition of longer sentences on criminals than
does California.76 Illinois, for example, punishes murder with a term
of twenty-to-forty years, or a term of "natural life imprisonment" if
specific aggravating factors are present in the case.77 California, on the
other hand, imposes a sentence of death for murder under aggravated
circumstances, death or life imprisonment for first-degree murder, and
a term of five, seven, or eleven years for second-degree murder.78 In-
terestingly, both California and Illinois provided for substantially
greater penalties under prior law for all felonies.79 The former Califor-
nia Adult Authority8 ° could determine a penalty for second-degree
murder from a term of five years to natural life,8' and the prior Illinois
statute required judges to impose a minimum sentence of fourteen
years for murder and permitted judges to decree any maximum term of
imprisonment over fourteen years.8 2 The actual sentences imposed
under the new law, however, may not differ significantly from those
under the prior law because the present statutory terms are based on
average sentences imposed under prior law for the same crimes.83 Both
the California and Illinois statutes provide that a prisoner shall not
serve a longer term if sentenced under the new law for a crime commit-
ted before the effective date of the legislation than if sentenced under
the prior law.8 4
75. See notes 54-55, 57-62 supra and accompanying text.
76. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(2) (Deering 1979) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-8-1 (1978).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1979). Aggravating factors exist: if the victim
was a peace officer, fireman, inmate, or Department of Corrections official; if the defendant has
been convicted previously of two or more murders; if the victim was aboard a hijacked vehicle; if
the murder was committed pursuant to contract; or if the murder was committed in the course of
another felony (armed robbery, robbery, rape, kidnapping, arson, or burglary). Id.
78. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.2 (Deering 1979).
79. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering 1976) with CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering 1979); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (1973) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (1979).
80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000 (Deering 1976) (amended 1976).
81. Id. § 190 (Deering 1979).
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (1973) (amended 1978).
83. See Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time, "supra note 28, at 634-36 & nn.81 & 88-9 1; Senate Bill
42, supra note 25, at 1189-90, 1196-1200.




The new legislation in each state also affects the use of concurrent
and consecutive sentences for multiple convictions." Both acts provide
that sentences shall run concurrently if the court fails to expressly im-
pose consecutive terms, 6 and both states apply an "aggregate formula"
to calculate multiple sentences when consecutive sentences are im-
posed.87 The Illinois statute, however, prohibits the judge from impos-
ing a consecutive sentence unless "such a term is required to protect the
public from further criminal conduct by the defendant."8 8 The Califor-
nia provision permits the judge who decides the later conviction to
choose between the consecutive or concurrent form. 9 Because the Illi-
nois provision permits less judicial discretion in the use of consecutive
sentences, it should better promote uniformity of sentences than the
California version.9°
Under the recent revisions in California and Illinois, each state now
requires a written record of the reasons for the judge's selection of a
sentence.91 This requirement represents an important departure from
previous practices, in which California law did not provide for any jus-
tification and Illinois law allowed the judge to determine in his own
discretion whether to write a summary of reasons for imposing a partic-
ular sentence.92 A major cause of appellate reticence in overturning
trial courts' discretionary acts is the lack of reliable information about
the judge's reasons for a ruling.93 A written record thus provides an
85. Under a concurrent sentence system, a prisoner serves all sentences simultaneously; when
sentences run consecutively, the additional sentences follow the completion of the original.
86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 669 (Deering 1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-8-4(b) (1979). See
generally Connell, Criminal Law" Concurrent and Consecutive Sentencing, 1973 ILL. L.F. 423.
87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(a) (Deering 1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-8-4(c)(2)
(1979). See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1155(3) (Supp. 1978); S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., § 2304 (1978). See generally Cassou & Taugher, supra note 58, at 62.
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(b) (1979).
89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 669 (Deering 1979).
90. See also Connell, supra note 85, at 440-41.
91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(c) (Deering 1979); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1(c) (1978).
See also S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2003(b) (oral statement in open court). Maine requires no
written or oral statement.
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1(d) (1974) (amended 1978). See generally Griffiths,
Ideology in Criminal Procedure, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial
Sentencingfor Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 821 (1968).
93. See Rubin, Judicial Resistance to Sentencing Accountabili
. 
21 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
201, 203 (1975) (written record of sentencing reasons is essential to effective appellate review);
Note, Appellate Review ofSentences and the Needfor a Reviewable Record, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1357
(discussion of arguments for and against written statement of sentencing reasons).
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effective basis for appellate review94 and promotes utmost judicial
care.95 The requirement also encourages uniformity among individual
judge's decisions because of the possibility that scrutiny of the record
will reveal an arbitrary sentencing decision.96
To aid the court in its sentence determinations, Illinois and Califor-
nia mandate presentence investigations.97 An Illinois judge may not
sentence a defendant convicted of a felony until a presentence investi-
gatory report is filed with the court.98 The Illinois statute specifies in-
clusion in the report of certain items calculated to reflect a complete
view of the defendant's background and character.99 This requirement
94. "Without such statements, any future review must rely upon mere conjecture or surmise
in determining how the final penalty was selected." Korbakes, Criminal Sentencing: Should the
"Judge's Sound Discretion"be Explained?, 59 JUD. 185, 187 (1975). See also Berkowitz, The Con-
stitutional Requirementfor a Written Statement ofReasons and Facts in Stpport ofthe Sentencing
Decision: A Due Process Proposal, 60 IOwA L. REv. 205, 211 (1974). The lack of a written state-
ment was a consideration in the court's decision to remand the following cases: United States v.
Bowser, 497 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Driscoll, 496 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1973).
95. The judge exercises more care because he is aware, on the basis of other judges' state-
ments in similar cases, that a particular sentence cannot be justified on the facts. Coburn, supra
note 5, at 217.
96. Id See ABA STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW § 2.3(a) (Tentative Draft 1968). The
English practice is similar to that in the majority of American jurisdictions. The Powers of Crimi-
nal Courts Act of 1973 requires a written statement of reasons for a sentence only when the de-
fendant is over 21 and the offense is his first. Ashworth, Justfying the First Prison Sentence, 1977
CRIM. L. REV. 661, 661. See Note, European Approaches to Problems in the Sentencing Process, 3
NEW ENG. J. PRISON L. 171 (1976).
97. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-3-1, 1005-3-2, 1005-4-1 (1978). CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 1203, 1204 (Deering 1979). In California the report is called a "probation report." Neither
California nor Illinois requires disclosure of the report to the defendant. See People v. Forman,
108 Ill. App. 2d 482, 247 N.E.2d 917 (1969); People v. Stroup, 96 Ill. App. 2d 315, 239 N.E.2d 1
(1968). See also People v. Jerrick, 62 Il. App. 3d 914, 379 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (presentence report
does not obviate need for diagnostic examinations before sentencing); People v. Burdine, 57 I11.
App. 3d 677, 373 N.E.2d 694 (1978) (inaccuracies in presentence report may be waived); People v.
Cook, 31 Ill. App. 3d 363, 334 N.E.2d 834 (1975) (court allowed under prior law to consider
presentence report).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) requires that a presentence investigation be conducted in the federal
courts, and that the contents be disclosed to the defense. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977) (denial of presentence report to defendant sentenced to death violates due process clause);
1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 728. Butsee lacovetti v. United States, 534 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1976) (court
narrowly construed Rule 32 (c) to avoid release of report to defendant). For a criticism of disclo-
sure, see Roche, The Positionfor Confdentiality of/he Presentence Investigaion Report, 29 ALB. L.
REV. 206 (1965).
98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-1 (1978).
99. Id. § 1005-3-2 (defendant's personal, medical, and criminal history; availability of treat-
ment facilities suited to defendant's needs; effect of the offense on the victims; defendant's status
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substantially improves upon prior Illinois law, which allowed the de-
fendant to waive the report and failed to delineate its content.'0° Illi-
nois demands the more complete report; California merely mandates a
probation report that "may be considered either in aggravation or miti-
gation of the punishment."'' Under either statute, presentence reports
may reduce disparity by providing judges with a common set of review-
able factors, but these factors, which include the individual characteris-
tics of each defendant, also may introduce greater disparity in
sentencing for identical crimes. 10 2
Judges also consider factors in aggravation and mitigation of the sen-
tence during the presentence (California) or sentence (Illinois) hear-
ing.0 3 The California judge must sentence the defendant to the middle
term of those specified in the statute for the particular crime (e.g., seven
years for second-degree murder for which the statute prescribes a term
of five, seven, or eleven years imprisonment), unless factors in mitiga-
tion or aggravation justify the lower or upper term.t" California law
since arrest; an alternate plan, where proper, to institutional sentencing; results of mental and
physical tests of defendant, if ordered by the court). See Berkowitz, supra note 93, at 215. See
also New York City Board of Correction, Pre-sentence Reports: Utility or Futility?, 2 FORDHAM
URB. LJ. 27 (1973).
Because some courts lack a professional probation staff, the statute does not designate a particu-
lar officer or organization to prepare the report. The court, however, must appoint a qualified
neutral party for this purpose. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-1 (1973) (Council Commentary).
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-1 (1973) (amended 1978). FED. R. CiNss. P. 32(c) allows
the defendant to waive the report with the court's consent.
101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (Deering 1979).
102. But see notes 106-07 infra and accompanying text. This disparity also can be reduced by
informed appellate review. See Blake, Appellate Review of Criminal Sentencing in the Federal
Courts, 24 U. KAN. L. REV. 279, 302 (1976). Seegeneraly Katkin, Presentence Reports: An Anay-
sis of Uses, Limitations and CivilLiberties Issues, 55 MINN. L. REV. 15 (1970); Note, supra note 92,
at 1371-74; Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 681 (1971).
103. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1204 (Deering 1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1 (1978) (the
presentence report also includes these factors to some extent). See People v. Burdine, 57 Ill. App.
3d 677, 373 N.E.2d 694 (1978).
104. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203-1204 (Deering 1979). See also People v. Saffell, 87 Cal. App.
3d 157, 150 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1978) (violation of equal protection to require mentally disordered sex-
offenders amenable to treatment to serve the upper term when other defendants receive middle
term for the same crime). Accord, People v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 407, 145 Cal. Rptr.
711 (1978). See also In re Eric J., 86 Cal. App. 3d 513, 150 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1978) (violation of
equal protection to impose upper term on juvenile without finding of aggravating factors when
such a finding is necessary for adult defendants); In re John W., 81 Cal. App. 3d 994, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 826 (1978) (adjustment of sentence under § 1170.2 for sentence imposed under indetermi-
nate sentence law allows imposition of upper term even in absence of ordinarily required finding
of aggravating factors).
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does not specify what factors must be considered in the determination
of mitigation or aggravation. 05 Illinois law, in contrast, delineates fac-
tors that must be "accorded weight" in the judge's decision to minimize
or maximize a sentence. 0 6 Illinois thus seeks to counterbalance dispar-
ity-causing considerations of a defendant's individual characteristics10 7
by specifying factors that courts must consider in aggravation or miti-
gation.
A final noteworthy revision in the Illinois and California statutes
concerns appellate review. The Illinois act permits an appellate court
to "modify. . . and enter any sentence that the trial judge could have
entered, including increasing or decreasing the sentence or entering an
alternative sentence to a prison term."'' 8 The statute establishes a re-
buttable presumption that the trial judge acted properly, 0 9 but the pre-
sumption is less difficult to overcome than under the prior statute,
which permitted an appellate court to alter a sentence only if the trial
judge clearly abused his discretion.I" Along with Illinois' requirement
105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (Deering 1979). Either party may submit a statement in
aggravation or mitigation to contradict or support the probation investigation. Id For a criticism
that these California provisions are unconstitutionally vague, see Uelmen, Proof of Aggra'atlan
Under the Caifornia Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act: The Constitutional Issues, 10 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 725, 731-35 (1977).
106. The statute lists these factors in mitigation: defendant's conduct caused no physical
harm; defendant acted with strong provocation; grounds exist tending to justify defendant's act;
another person induced defendant's act; no history of prior crimes; defendant's character indicates
that recidivism is unlikely; defendant is likely to comply with probation terms; and imprisonment
would endanger medical condition of defendant. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.1 (1978).
Factors in aggravation include: the conduct caused serious harm; defendant received compensa-
tion for the act; history of criminal activity; defendant by duties of his position was obligated to
prevent the crime; and defendant held public office, and crime related to the official conduct. Id.
§ 1005-5-3.2. New York is the only other state to include specific factors in its statute. The list,
however, is shorter and more general. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00(l) (McKinney 1975). For a criti-
cism that lists are too restrictive, see Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time," supra note 28, at 632.
107. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
108. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.1 (1978). See also People v. Bean, 63 I11. App. 3d 264,
379 N.E.2d 723 (1978) (when appellate court reduces degree of offense, it may also reduce the
imposed sentence).
109. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.1 (1978). See also People v. Davis, 65 111. App. 3d 580,
382 N.E.2d 594 (1978) (rebuttable presumption that trial judge acted properly). Accord, People v,
Willis, 64 Ill. App. 3d 737, 382 N.E.2d 358 (1978); People v. Rogers, 64 Ill. App. 3d 290, 382
N.E.2d 1236 (1978); People v. Andreano, 64 I11. App. 3d 551, 381 N.E.2d 783 (1978); People v,
Schomer, 64 Ill. App. 3d 440, 381 N.E.2d 62 (1978).
110. "While Illinois enjoys this broader scope of review, the practice of Illinois appellate
courts is to respect the trial judge's discretion unless clearly abusive." Illinois Reconsiders "Flat
Time,"supra note 28, at 637. See People v. Doyle, 50 Ill. App. 3d 876, 365 N.E.2d 1184 (1977) (no
reversal unless clear abuse of discretion); accord, People v. Givens, 46 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 361
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/10
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of a written statement from the judge of reasons for his choice of sen-
tence, tl' this change in standards of review facilitates appellate review
and illustrates Illinois' firm intent to eradicate sentence disparity."12
California also authorizes appellate review of sentences," 3 but ap-
pears to adhere to the stricter "abuse of discretion" standard."' Cali-
fornia also mandates that the Community Release Board review a
sentence within one year from the date of imprisonment and recom-
mends that the sentencing court resentence the prisoner if the Board
finds the sentence to be disparate with others.' Review by the Com-
N.E.2d 671 (1977); People v. Wilson, 32 IlL. App. 3d 57, 335 N.E.2d 499 (1975), rev'don other
grounds, 66 Ill. 2d 346, 362 N.E.2d 291 (1977); People v. Long, 30 111. App. 3d 815, 333 N.E.2d 534
(1975); People v. Young, 30 Il. App. 3d 176, 332 N.E.2d 173 (1975).
The following states use the abuse-of-discretion standard: ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 (1978);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4037(b) (1977); HAW. REv. STAT. § 641-11 (1976); IOWA CODE §
814.6 (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2308 (1975); N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 470 (McKinney 1975);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1066 (Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 138.050 (1973-1974). For detailed
excursions through the federal decisions, see Note, supra note 93; 23 DRAKE L. REV. 191 (1973);
45 U. COLO. L. REV. 209 (1973). For an analysis of the exceptions to the federal doctrine of
limited appellate review, see Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Return to
the Concept ofAppellate Review, 53 NEB. L. REV. 463, 488-90 (1974).
111. See notes 91-96 supra and accompanying text.
112. Arguments against appellate review include: the appellate court's inadequate view of the
trial proceeding; the trial judge's greater familiarity with the defendant; the encouragement of
frivolous appeals; and the few sentences that would be modified. Hopkins, Reviewing Sentencing
Discretion: A Method of Swift Appellate Action, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 491, 492-95 (1976); Com-
ment, Appellate Review ofSentences: A SurveY, 17 ST. Louis L.J. 221, 245-46 (1976); 58 IowA L.
REV. 469, 483-84 (1972).
Arguments in favor of appellate review include: correction of disparity in punishment; appel-
late freedom commensurate with other reviewable areas of trial discretion; correction of arbitrary
sentences; and standardized guidelines for lower courts. Coburn, supra note 5, at 216; Hopkins,
supra, at 491; Comment, ABA Minimum Standardsfor Criminal Justice-A Student Symposium, 33
LA. L. REV. 559, 561-62 (1973).
Four states have created a specific court to review sentences: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-195
(1979); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2141 (Supp. 1978); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 28A
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-2501 (Supp. 1977).
For a discussion of England's Court of Criminal Appeals, which can review sentences, see D.
THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING 40-45 (1970).
113. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(f) (Deering 1979). See also Comment, supra note 60, at 156-
58.
114. See People v. Alexander, 74 Cal. App. 3d 20, 141 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1977); People v. Harris,
73 Cal. App. 3d 76, 140 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1977) (discretion abused only where ruling "exceeds the
bounds of reason"); In re Carter, 19 Cal. App. 3d 479, 97 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1971); People v. Fusaro,
IS Cal. App. 3d 877, 96 Cal. Rptr. 368, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 912 (1971).
The proposed federal criminal code provides for review of sentences, but restricts it to sentences
either below the minimum or above the maximum allowed. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 3725
(1978).
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170() (Deering 1979).
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munity Release Board should decrease arbitrary sentencing." 16
III. CONCLUSION
No nation has experimented as devotedly with the indeterminate
sentence as the United States. "7 The ideal of rehabilitation, which un-
derlies the argument for the indeterminate sentence, is noble but
unachievable in the overburdened American penal systems."l 8 Present
prison facilities are sadly ineffective in "curing" the socially and men-
tally impaired prisoner," 9 and terms served by prisoners under the in-
determinate system differ arbitrarily.
California and Illinois lead the movement away from the indetermi-
nate sentence system toward the more realistic and more evenhanded
structures of the determinate sentence and the elimination of parole in
its traditional form. Illinois more painstakingly outlines the procedures
for implementing the new approach to sentencing, 20 but California
also has designed a plan that will likely increase uniformity of
sentences and reduce judicial discretion.' 2'
Neither sentencing plan, however, will fully eradicate sentence dis-
parity. Each state allows for consideration of the defendant's personal
needs and situation, which inevitably introduces elements of inequita-
ble treatment among defendants for similar crimes. Illinois' considera-
tion of factors in aggravation and mitigation of the defendant's offense
and California's manipulation of postimprisonment terms through its
Community Release Board also inject elements of personal attention
into an otherwise fair sentencing procedure. California and Illinois
have nevertheless taken bold and commendable steps to eliminate sen-
116. See Note, The PotentialAdequacy ofthe Cal/fornia Uniform Determinate Sentence Law,
10 Sw. U.L. REv. 149, 163-64 (1978).
117. China practices indeterminate sentencing. See Edwards, Reflections on Crime and Punish.
ment in China, With Appended Sentencing Documents, 16 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 45, 59 (1977).
Scandinavian countries, the Soviet Union, and England also employ the indeterminate sentence.
See Andenaes, The Future of Criminal Law, 1971 CiuM. L. REV. 615, 620-27.
118. See Cole, Will Dfinite Sentences Make a Dfference?, 61 Jun. 58, 64 (1977). The author
disputes claims that the definite sentence will control disparity and discretion, because the prison
system remains bureaucratic in nature. The author also questions the wisdom of eliminating pa-
role because the overcrowded prisons require an increasingly faster turnover rate.
119. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 68, 106, 116, 139 supra and accompanying text.
121. See llinois Reconsiders "Flat Time," supra note 28, at 662; Comment, supra note 60, at
[Vol. 1979:551
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tence disparity and to provide uniformity of sentencing.122
William T Carey
122. The following states also have considered or are considering sentencing reforms not
based on rehabilitation: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Minne-
sota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington. Cole, supra note
1 18, at 59-60 n.5.
California has established a Judicial Council to study patterns of sentencing under the determi-
nate system. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(f) (Deering 1979). Illinois now also has a Criminal Sen-
tencing Commission, which reviews the effect of determinate sentencing on prison populations,
the effectiveness of felony classification and determinate sentencing, and the uniformity of
sentences. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-10-1 to 1005-10-2 (1978).
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